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EDITORIAL NOTES
ville School of Law. He is teaching courses in Conflicts, Federal
Procedure, Criminal Law, and Insurance.
The enrollment of the Law School for the Academic year 1938-
1939 totals 168 students, which is the largest since 1926 and an
increase of eight percent over the preceding year. The first year
class of seventy-four students, also the largest since 1926, is
fifty percent larger than the entering class of two years ago.
Two-thirds of the student body have had three years or more
of college work before entering law school, and forty students
hold Bachelor's degrees.
The Law Quarterly Staff will be represented at a conference
of representatives of midwestern law reviews, sponsored by the
Board of Editors of the Iowa Law Review on December 3, 1938,
at Iowa City.
NOTES
NATURE OF INTERESTS CREATED BY OIL
LEASES IN ILLINOIS
I
The collision of the old rule, cujus est solum ejus est usque ad
coelum et ad inferos, with the strong social and economic pres-
sure for production of oil, and the impossibility of such produc-
tion by any landowner without the possibility of draining the
oil of his neighbor has resulted in a conflicting array of com-
promises between legal theory and economic necessity. As a
result of the varying degrees to which state courts are willing'
to effect this compromise, there exists a corresponding variance
in the fundamental concept of the interest held by a landowner
in the underlying oil and gas and in the interests created by
him in others by contracts in respect thereto.
Concerning the extent and nature of the estate which an owner
of the surface holds in the underlying oil and gas, the conflict
is clear and definite. The states are divided into what are known
as the "ownership" and the "non-ownership" groups. The ma-
jority of the important oil producing states1 adopt the doctrine,
1. Including Pennsylvania, Texas, Arkansas, West Virginia, Montana,
and Tennessee. See Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil & Gas Co. (1912)
103 Ark. 175, 146 S. W. 122; Gas Products Co. v. Rankin (1922) 63 Mont.
372, 207 Pac. 993, 24 A. L. R. 294; Nonamaker v. Amos (1905) 73 Ohio
St. 163, 76 N. E. 949; Hyde v. Rainey (1912) 233 Pa. 540, 82 Atl. 781,
Ann. Cas. 1913B 726; Murray v. Allred (1897) 100 Tenn. 100, 43 S. W.
355; Taylor v. Country School Trustees of Eastland Cty. (Tex. Civ. App.
1921) 229 S. W. 670; Haskell v. Sutton (1903) 53 W. Va. 206, 44 S. E. 533.
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on analogy to that applied to solid minerals, that the owner of
-the fee, or of oil and gas by a separate estate, holds absolute
title to the minerals in place. 2 A universally recognized qualifi-
cation of this rule is that the estate is subject to being divested
'by drainage resulting from wells drilled upon adjacent property.3
The "non-ownership" group,4 in view of the fugacious character
of oil and gas, deny that there can be such a thing as ownership
in these minerals in place and limit the interest of the land-
owner therein to a bare privilege to take. This second theory
was, in certain early cases, derived by analogy from the rule
applied to animals ferae naturae; but the weakness of this ana-
logy was exposed by the United State Supreme Court in Ohio
Oil Co. v. Indian, 5 which, although adopting the non-ownership
theory because of the fugacious nature of the subject matter,
pointed out that unlike the privilege of taking wild animals
which vests in all as a part of the public domain, the right to
take oil and gas from the earth is vested exclusively in the
owner of the surface, so long as it shall remain within his soil.
While the lease and not the outright purchase and grant has
developed as the more practical device for oil and gas production,
the distinction remains important since in the "ownership" states
the insertion of the words "grant" and "convey" has been con-
strued as effecting an outright grant of a separate mineral
estate,' while in the "non-ownership" states the same rule is
applied to these operative words as to leases expressly creating
a mere privilege to enter and prospect. 6"
Neither the absolute ownership theory nor the non-ownership-
privilege theory is strictly accurate, it has been contended, since
both the physical attributes and the economic policies peculiar
to oil and gas make any analogy to solid minerals of question-
able legal and economic validity; while to characterize the
interest as a bare privilege is to understate, for the landowner's
rights and privileges, if less than ownership, constitute substan-
2. See Veasey, The Law of Oil and Gas (1920) 18 Mich. L. Rev. 445, 462.
3. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co. (1907) 216 Pa. 362, 65
At. 801; Jones v. Forest Oil Co. (1900) 194 Pa. 379, 44 Atl. 1074, 48
L. R. A. 748; Summers, Oil & Gas (1st ed. 1926) 73, sec. 2.
4. Including Illinois, Indiana, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. See Transcon-
tinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson (1921) 298 Ill. 394, 131 N. E. 645, 16 A. L. R.
507; Tyner v. People's Gas Co. (1891) 131 Ind. 408, 31 N. E. 61; Lieber v.
Ouachita-Natural Gas & Oil Co. (1922) 153 La. 160, 95 So. 538; Kolachny
v. Galbreath (1910) 26 Okla. 772, 110 Pac. 902, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 451.
5. (1899) 177 U. S. 190, 209.
6. In re Prager's Estate (1920) 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 592.
6a. Watford Oil Co. v. Shipman (1908) 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53, 122 Am.
St. Rep. 144.
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tial property rights.7 However desirable a more accurate analysis
and classification of property rights or the creation of some new
estate to fit this space between ownership and non-ownership
might be, the states where th- importance of the industry has
resulted in anything like exhaustive definition are so far com-
mitted to one or the other of the doctrines that that chosen will
presumably continue to be followed.
In Illinois, though the matter has not been extensively liti-
gated, the decisions adhere to the non-ownership view consis-
tently enough to render a change in the future improbable, espe-
cially since the Texas rule, despite its claimed greater clarity,
does not appear in practice more satisfactory than the non-own-
ership theory as applied in Oklahoma. In the first Illinois case
on the subject, Bruner v. Hicks,$ the court stated:
It may be conceded that title to the oil and gas -in said
lands did not vest until the oil and gas were discovered and
appropriated.'
The principle was restated in Watford Oil and Gas Co. v. Ship-
man" where the court, relying upon the fugitive nature of oil
and gas and following Dark v. Johnson" and Sheppard v. Mc-
Calmont Oil Company,12 said:
A lease of land to enter and prospect for oil and gas is a
grant of a privilege to enter and prospect, but does not give
title to the oil and gas until such products are found. * * *
Oil and gas while in the earth, unlike solid minerals, cannot
be the subject of ownership distinct from the soil. A grant
of oil and gas passes nothing which can be the subject of an
ejectment or other real action. It is a grant, not of the oil
in the ground, but to such part thereof as the grantee may
find.2'
In Poe v. Ulrey,4 however, the court, exhibiting the confusion
prevalent in the field, said that oil and gas, while not subject to
absolute ownership, "belong to the owner of the land under
which they are located so long as they remain there, but when
they escape and go under other land the title of the former owner
is lost,"$ a statement approximating the Texas view. 6 The opin-
7. Summers, Oil & Gas (1st ed. 1926) 66, 144.
8. (1908) 230 Ill. 536, 82 N. E. 888, 120 Am. St. Rep. 332.
9. 82 N. E. at 891.
10. (1908) 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53, 122 Am. St. Rep. 144.
11. (1871) 55 Pa. 164.
12. (1885) 38 Hun (N. Y.) 37.
13. 84 N. E. at 54.
14. (1908) 233 I1. 56, 84 N. E. 46.
15. 84 N. E. at 48. (Italics supplied.)
16. Supra, notes 2 and 3.
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ion added that the grantee of such owner is not vested with any
estate in the oil and gas until it is actually found. This state-
ment would seem to nullify its previous assertion that the land-
owner holds a title subject to defeasance, because presumably
any estate held by him could, by proper grant, be created in his
grantee. The further implication from this last statement, that
a lessee though having no estate in the underlying oil prior to
discovery attains a vested estate in such oil when found, is in-
consistent with the entire non-ownership theory, based as it is
upon the fugacious character of the mineral, which is not altered
by the drilling of a producing well. Probably, however, this state-
ment contemplated no change from the existing rule that there
could be no separate estate in oil and gas, but used the word,
"found," to signify production or appropriation, in which event
the estate referred to as vesting is more properly an interest in
personalty than an estate in realty27 This view would seem to
be confirmed by the reiteration of the non-ownership theory in
Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson? 8 and, to a certain extent,
by Conover v. Parker."9 This last decision, while denying that a
lease to the oil company vested any estate in the oil, supported
a devise by the lessor as conveying an interest therein-a seem-
ing contradiction explainable only upon the theory that the court
construed the devise as a grant, not of realty, but of the testa-
tor's interest, which was an interest in the oil when produced
and reduced to possession in the form of personalty.
Although the Illinois courts have more or less consistently
adhered to the view that a lessee has no separate estate in the
oil, they have not denied that an oil and gas lease may create
some interest in land. In the first case2 0 it was stated that an
17. Sheppard v. McCalmont Oil Company (1885) 38 Hun (N. Y.) 37.
18. (1921) 298 Ill. 394, 131 N. E. 645, 16 A. L. R. 507.
19. (1923) 305 Ill. 292, 137 N. E. 204. The fee owner here leased all
his lands for oil, reserving a one-eighth royalty and thereafter devised his
land to each of his six children together with one-seventh of all oil under
the real estate of which he died seized, without regard to the amount of
the surface estate devised to each such devisee. After the death of one
of the children her husband sued to recover her interest in the oil being
produced, which he claimed to be a one-seventh of the one-eighth reserved
by the testator or a one fifty-sixth of all oil being then produced from the
lease. It was objected that the testator by his lease had conveyed title to all
the oil to the lessee and retained only a chose in action to recover the value
of one-eighth, and that the devise to the deceased child carried no estate or
interest in the oil which could pass to the husband. The court answered
that the lease passed no estate in the oil but only a privilege to come on
the land and drill. The court then affirmed the finding of the lower court
decreeing the husband to be vested of a one fifty-sixth interest in the oil.
20. (1908) 230 Ill. 536, 82 N. E. 888, 120 Am. St. Rep. 332.
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oil and gas lease which gave a right to occupy the premises and
which might last indefinitely created in the surface, and apart
from the oil, a freehold interest in land, and necessitated a re-
lease of the homestead rights. In the Watford case,21 the court
re-stated its position in Bruner v. Hicks"2 but announced that
the interest of the lessee would not permit him to maintain par-
tition, ejectment, or other actions to recover realty.
Three views have been advanced upon the right to possessory
actions. In the "ownership" states it is held that a lessee has
a corporeal interest in the land and can maintain possessory
actions.2 3 Among "non-ownership" states, most courts, relying
upon the fugitive nature of the subject, deny that it can be the
subject of a corporeal interest and classify it instead as an in-
corporeal hereditament."- In Pennsylvania 2 5 and California 26 the
corporeal or incorporeal nature of the interest created has been
made to turn upon the wording of the granting clause. In Barns-
dall v. Bradford Gas Co. 2 7 the Pennsylvania court characterized
a lease for mineral purposes as creating a corporeal interest in
land, as distinguished from a grant of authority to enter and
operate for minerals, classified as simply a license and so an
incorporeal hereditament.
In Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson2' the nature of the
interest created by a lease was before the Illinois court. The
state sought to tax an oil company upon its oil leases as "tangi-
ble" property under section 106 of the General Corporation Act,29
"tangible" being defined in section 137 as "corporeal" property.
The leases were in the form of grants of land for drilling pur-
poses, and the court, relying upon Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas
Co.,"° held the interest so created to be corporeal property, not
merely an incorporeal hereditament; but it did so without any
reference to the distinction in that case concerning the nature of
21. (1908) 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53, 122 Am. St. Rep. 144.
22. (1908) 230 Ill. 536, 82 N. E. 888, 120 Am. St. Rep. 332.
23. Texas v. Daugherty (1915) 107 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717; Texas v.
Davis (1923) 113 Tex. 212, 254 S. W. 311.
24. Federal Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co. (C. C. D. Ind. 1902) 112 Fed.
372; Waimer v. Mallory (1902) 169 N. Y. 501, 62 N. E. 584; Heller v.
Dailey (1901) 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N. E. 490; Kolachny v. Galbreath (1910)
26 Okla. 772. 110 Pac. 902. The only Missouri case construing such an
instrument treats it as an option and not as a lease. Morton v. Drosten
(Mo. App. 1916) 185 S. W. 733.
25. Karns v. Tanner (1871) 66 Pa. 297.
26. Chandler v. Hart (1911) 161 Cal. 405, 119 Pac. 516.
27. (1893) 152 Pa. 82, 25 At. 237.
28. (1921) 298 I1. 394, 131 N. E. 645, 16 A. L. R. 507.
29. I1. Smith-Hurd's Ann. Stats. (1935) c. 32, sec. 157.132.
20. (1893) 152 Pa. 82, 25 Atl. 237.
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the granting clause. If the case is to be construed as adopting
the distinction laid down in the Barnsdall case, it in effect over-
rules the Watford case 31 where the lessee's right to possessory
actions was denied, because in both the Watford and the Trans-
continental Oil cases the lease by its terms was of the whole
premises for mining purposes, not a grant of a mere exclusive
privilege to drill. However, it would seem probable that Illinois
will continue to deny the right to possessory actions, as was done
in the Watford case and as is done in the great majority of the
other states in the "non-ownership" group, regardless of the
nature of the granting clause.32 The Emmerson case may be
confined to its own special facts, as a classification for the pur-
pose of a particular taxing statute. Adherence to the original
rule was indicated in Conover v. Parker,8 3 a later case, where the
court, citing the Watford case, said by way of dictum that the
lease conveyed no interest in land; a grant of all the oil instead
of a lease of the land was involved, but the court made no effort
to ground its decision upon the distinction in the Barnsdall
case.34
A lessee does have an interest which will support an injunc-
tion against drilling by a subsequent lessee. 35 Such interest is
within the statute of frauds.38 While some jurisdictions regard
this interest as inchoate and unvested until oil is discovered, 37
it was stated in Bruner v. Hicks38 that the lease created "a pres-
ent vested right in the premises." The statement in Poe v.
Ulrey3 9 that the lease vested no estate until oil and gas were
actually found must have had reference to the interest in the
oil and not to any interest in the premises, as the case further
stated that a lease, to be valid, might require a release of the
homestead rights. 40
II
Generally a remainderman cannot execute a valid lease be-
cause he has no right to possession .4  The power of a life tenant
31. (1908) 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53, 122 Am. St. Rep. 144.
32. See Summers, Oil & Gas (1st ed. 1926) 174, sec. 53.
33. (1923) 305 Ill. 292, 137 N. E. 204.
34. (1893) 152 Pa. 82, 25 At]. 237.
35. Gillespie v. Fulton Oil Co. (1909) 236 Ill. 188, 86 N. E. 219.
36. Prout v. Hoy (1914) 263 Ill. 54, 105 N. E. 26.
37. Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts (1893) 152 Pa. 451, 25 Atl. 732; Crawford
v. Ritchey (1896) 43 W. Va. 252, 27 S. E. 220.
38. (1908) 230 Ill. 536, 82 N. E. 888, 120 Am. St. Rep. 332.
39. (1908) 233 Ill. 56, 84 N. E. 46.
40. See also Prout v. Hoy (1914) 263 Ill. 54, 105 N. E. 26, and Watford
v. Shipman (1908) 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53, 122 Am. St. Rep. 144.
41. Deffenbaugh v. Hess (1909) 225 Pa. 638, 74 At]. 608; Summers, Oil
& Gas (1st ed. 1926) 226, sec. 66.
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to operate, or make a lease, for oil and gas will depend upon
whether such act constitutes waste. The common law limitation
that only life estates created by law and not to conventional life
estates were so impeachable4 2 does not appear to have been much
observed in the modern law of oil and gas.4 3 In some states the
common law distinction has been abolished by statute.4 In Ohio
Oil Co. v. Daughtee 4 where a trustee for both life tenant and
remainderman leased for the benefit of the life tenant alone, the
court in affirming an injunction against the lessee requested by
the remainderman stated:
A life tenant has no right to operate for oil. Neither
could the trustee operate for his benefit. The taking out of
the oil would be waste."6
The rule was followed in the only other Illinois cases dealing
with the subject, Sewell v. Sewell- and Prout v. Hoy.4 The dis-
tinction between conventional life estates and those created by
law is of no significance as the Illinois statute on waste applies
to both.49"
While neither life tenant nor remainderman may singly exe-
cute a lease, they may do so jointly." Leases given by either
alone have been said to be void,50 but the statement appears not
to be strictly accurate. Thus where a lessee secured leases inde-
pendently from the life tenant and from the remainderman,51
where separate leases were executed by each to different lessees
but eventually both were assigned to the same person, 2 or where
a lease executed by a life tenant was ratified by a separate docu-
ment executed by the remainderman, 3 the separately ineffective
acts have been given effect as a result of the merger of rights.
Whether a lease executed by a remainderman alone is vali-
42. Walker, Fee Simple Ownership in Oil and Gas (1928) 6 Tex. L.
Rev. 125, 142.
43. Williams v. Jones (1896) 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S. E. 411; Marshall v.
Mellon (1897) 179 Pa. 425, 34 Atl. 564; Meredith v. Meredith (1921) 193
Ky. 192, 235 S. W. 757; Deffenbaugh v. Hess (1909) 225 Pa. 638, 74 At].
608. See also Note (1912) 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1099.
44. Walker, supra, note 42, at 142.
45. (1909) 240 Ill. 361, 88 N. E. 818.
46. 88 N. E. at 820.
47. (1936) 363 Ill. 166, 1 N. E. (2d) 492.
48. (1914) 263 Ill. 54, 105 N. E. 26.
48a. Ill. Smith-Hurd's Rev. Stats. (1937) c. 41, sec. 45.
49. Summers, Oil & Gas (1st ed. 1926) 226, sec. 67.
50. See Gerkino v. Kentucky Salt Co. (1897) 100 Ky. 734, 39 S. W. 444,
66 Am. St. Rep. 370.
51. (1914) 263 Ill. 54, 105 N. E. 26.
52. Orndoff v. Consumer's Fuel Co. (1932) 308 Pa. 165, 162 Atl. 431.
53. Burden v. Gypsy Oil Co. (1935) 141 Kan. 147, 40 P. (2d) 463.
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dated by the death of the life tenant seems never to have been
decided in Illinois. A lease containing warranties would appear
to be amenable to the doctrine of estoppel by deed as applied in
Illinois ;54 but even in the absence of warranties, the court might
uphold the lease under the principle of Ziegler v. Brenneman,",
where a lease executed by a tenant in common without his co-
•tenant's consent was held binding upon the lessor although void
as to the cotenant.
A contingent remainderman has the same right to enjoin fu-
ture waste by the life tenant or his lessee as one holding a vested
remainder though he has no claim for past waste because he has
no certain estate in the land.56
The life tenant's refusal to join in a lease may result in the
draining off of the oil and damage to the inheritance of the re-
mainderman thereby. It has been urged, upon analogy to cases
where the English courts have permitted the remainderman to
cut timber to prevent damage to the inheritance by decay, 7 that
equity should grant relief in such a situation at least to the ex-
tent of permitting offset wells to be drilled.58
III
A life tenant and a remainderman who join in executing a
lease may agree upon a division of the royalties, but if they do
not, the court will order them impounded for the duration of the
life estate, the interest to be paid to the life tenant and the prin-
cipal to the remainderman upon termination of the life estate.50
However, the life tenant's right to the income being dependent
upon the consent of the remainderman, where he alone executes
54. Hitchcock v. Fortier (1875) 65 Ill. 239, 26 A. L. R. 176; Elder v.
Derby (1875) 66 I1. 519, 68 A. L. R. 101.
55. (1908) 237 Ill. 15, 86 N. E. 597. Suit to cancel lease as a cloud on
title was brought by co-tenants where lease was executed by one co-tenant
alone. " * * * one tenant in common may not prejudice the rights of his
co-tenants by a conveyance * * * of any interest in any specific part of the
common property, but such conveyance is valid as against the grantor, at
least by way of estonpel. It is only where, and as far as, it comes in cort-
flict with the interests of the co-tenants that it is void." 86 N. E. at 600.
56. Ohio Oil Co. v. Daughtee (1909) 240 Ill. 361, 88 N. E. 818.
57. Seagram v. Knight (1867) L. R. 2 Ch. App. 628; Tooker v. Annsley
(Ch. 1832) 5 Sim. 235, 58 Eng. Rep. 325; Hussey v. Hussey (Ch. 1820)
5 Madd. 44, 56 Eng. Rep. 811.
58. Simonton, Right of a Remainderman to Compel a Life Tenant to
Permit Development for Oil and Gas (1919) 26 W. Va. L. Q. 213.
59. Mills and Willingham, Law of Oil and Gas (1926) sec. 173; Sum-
mers, Oil & Gas (1st ed. 1926) sec. 196; Meredith v. Meredith (1921) 193
Ky. 192, 235 S. W. 757; Burden v. Gypsy Oil Co. (1935) 141 Kan. 147, 40
P. (2d) 463; Eakin v. Hawkins (1903) 52 W. Va. 124, 43 S. E. 211;
Blakeley v. Marshall (1896) 174 Pa. 425, 34 At]. 564.
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a lease without joinder or ratification, he is liable to the re-
mainderman for all royalties received.60
As to wells opened prior to, the commencement of the estate,
the life tenant is entitled to the whole royalty, not merely to the
interest thereon." This is a direct application of the law of
mines and minerals and an exception to the ordinary rule of
trusts which requires that any increase in the value of real estate
be reserved as corpus for the benefit of the remainderman and
the only income of the real estate be paid to the life tenant.62
While oil extracted from land, like other minerals, is in fact a
part of the estate which once removed can never inure to the
benefit of the remainderman, the rule in the general law of mines
and mining is established beyond question, 3 and there is noth-
ing in the nature of oil and gas to prevent its application.
The rule has been extended to the more doubtful case where
a lease has been executed by the testator or grantor, though no
wells have been drilled prior to the commencement of the estate.
The royalties being even more clearly not part of the existing
rents and profits of the land, the courts have been forced to
found their position upon the testator's intent.6 4 In Chaytor v.
Trotter"5 Williams, L. J., said:
* * * whether a mine is an "opened" mine or not an
"opened" mine when one is dealing with the question of the
rights of any person who has a life estate in the land, is a
question which really depends upon the intention of the
settlor or testator as the case may be.65
As a rule of construction rather than of property is involved, its
application would appear to be limited by other statements of
the grantor or testator as well as by the circumstances and sur-
rounding facts of the particular case.
60. Bond v. Godsey (1901) 99 W. Va. 564, 130 S. E. 142; Williams v.
Jones (1897) 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S. E. 411; Westmoreland Coal Company's
Appeal (1877) 85 Pa. 344.
61. Summers, supra note 59, at sec. 196; Mills and Willingham, supra
note 59 at 257, sec. 170; Koen v. Bartlett (1896) 41 W. Va. 559, 23 S. E.
664; Sayers v. Hoskinson (1888) 110 Pa. 473, 1 Atl. 308; Sewell v. Sewell
(1936) 363 Ill. 166, 1 N. E. (2d) 492; Lenfers v. Henke (1874) 73 Ill. 405,
16 L. R. A. 247; Restatement, Property (1936) secs. 119 (b) (c), 144.
62. 4 Bogert, Trusts (1935) 2393, sec. 823.
63. Bainbridge, Mines and Minerals (1871) 54; Priddy v. Griffith (1894)
150 Ill. 560, 37 N. E. 999; Hendrix v. McBeth (1883) 61 Ind. 473; Alder-
son v. Alderson (1900) 46 W. Va. 242, 33 S. E. 228, 5 Mor. Min. Rep. 74.
64. Priddy v. Griffith (1894) 150 Ill. 560, 37 N. E. 999; Higgins v. Snow
(1902) 113 Fed. 433; Koen v. Bartlett (1896) 41 W. Va. 559, 23 S. E.
664; Hendrix v. McBeth (1883) 61 Ind. 473.
65. (1902) 87 L. T. R. (N. S.) 33.
65a. 87 L. T. R. (N. S.) at 37.
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Whether a life tenant may take oil not only from the first sand
but also from underlying sands does not appear to have been
decided; but it would seem to depend upon whether a lease had
been executed prior to the life estate, or whether wells had been
actually opened prior thereto. The first case, being governed by
intention, would appear per se to present no sound reason for
imputing an intention to grant the privilege only as to the first
stratum of oil; but the latter case is controlled by the law of
mining, and while it is there conceded that the life tenant may
continue to work existing mines8 6 and even to open new pits or
shafts to reach the same stratum at another point, still he may
not penetrate to another stratum or vein.67
A lease jointly executed by life tenant and remainderman is
in no way invalidated by a later mortgage of the land, the
mortgage being subject to it.68 Under the title theory of mort-
gages, the mortgage acts as an assignment of the reversionary
interest entitling the mortgagee, after notice to the lessee, to the
royalties as rents issuing out of the land. 9 Under the lien theory,
the mortgagee is not entitled to the royalties unless he has en-
tered into possession70 or unless his security is so imperiled that
equity will appoint a receiver.71 In Illinois, where the lien theory
appears to be applied until default, whereupon the mortgagee
becomes vested with title,7 2 the mortgagee's right to royalties
would ordinarily accrue upon default if he gave notice to the
lessee.7 3 A mortgagor remaining in possession may make a valid
lease enforceable against the lessee, but the lease will not bind
the mortgagee, prejudice his title, or interfere with his right to
recover possession or re-enter upon breach of condition.7 Mere
breach of condition, however, does not entitle the mortgagee to
the royalties, there being no privity of estate between him and
the lessee which will entitle him to sue for breach of covenants
66. Lenfers v. Henke (1874) 73 Ill. 405, 16 L. R. A. 247; Westmoreland
Coal Co.'s Appeal (1877) 85 Pa. 344; Chaytor v. Trotter (1902) 87 L. T. R.
(N. S.) 33; Bond v. Godsey (1901) 99 W. Va. 564, 130 S. E. 142; Claver-
ing v. Clavering (1879) L. R. 4 App. Cas. 454.
67. Bainbridge, Mines and Minerals (1871) 42, 44.
68. 2 Jones, Mortgages (8th ed. 1928) 361, sec. 978.
69. Coffey v. Hunt (1885) 75 Ala. 236.
70. Mass. Hospital Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1847) 51 Mass. 126.
71. Home Life Ins. Co. v. O'Sullivan (1912) 151 App. Div. 535, 136
N. E. 105.
72. Rohrer v. Deatherage (1929) 336 Ill. 450, 168 N. E. 266.
73. Scheidt v. Belz (1879) 4 Ill. App. 431, Ann. Cas. 1916D 196;
Bradley v. Peabody Coal Co. (1902) 99 Ill. App. 427, 14 A. L. R. 640.
74. Gartside v. Outley (1871) 58 Ill. 210, 11 Am. Rep. 59; Taylor v.
Adams (1886) 115 Ill. 570, 4 N. E. 837; Greenbaum Sons v. Kingsbury
(1927) 248 Ill. App. 321"; 2 Jones, Mortgages (1928) sec. 981.
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in the lease unless created by attornment.75 But since the mort-
gagee after condition broken has the right to treat the lessee
as a trespasser, 8 he will ordinarily have little difficulty in coerc-
ing such attornment. In Illinois, attornment does not create a
new tenancy for the balance of the lease but only from year to
year."
Whether the doctrine of marshalling in inverse order is to be
applied on foreclosure for the benefit of the lessee of an oil and
gas lease does not appear to have been decided in "non-owner-
ship" states.78 In Texas, an "ownership" state, the land is not
to be sold as a whole but the mineral estate is subject to pay a
pre-existing mortgage only where the surface estate is insuffi-
cient.19 In Illinois, while the lessee does not have a separate
mineral estate, he does have an interest in the land separate and
distinct from that of his lessor. This interest, though more than
an incorporeal hereditament, is yet scarcely more than a profit
a prendre to which are annexed sufficient rights of entrance,
egress, right of ways, et cetera, to lead the court to call it a free-
hold interest in land. There would seem to be no good reason
why the usual rule of marshalling in inverse order which the
Illinois courts apply where the mortgagor subsequently conveys
a part of his fee,80 should not be invoked for the protection of
this interest. In Hyde Park Light Co. v. Brown"1 the rule wa%
invoked to protect one holding an easement to maintain tele-
graph poles, whose interest would appear to be rather slighter
than that arising under an oil and gas lease.
V
Quite generally, when oil is discovered, the lessee is under an
implied duty reasonably to develop the rest of the land leased. 2
Under a lease for no specific term of years, the so-called "no
75. Jones, loc. cit. supra, note 74.
76. Gartside v. Outley (1871) 58 Ill. 210, 11 Am. Rep. 59; Rohrer v.
Deatherage (1929) 336 Ill. 450 168 N. E. 266.
77. Taylor v. Adams (1886) 115 Ill. 570, 4 N. E. 837; Gartside v. Outley
(1871) 58 Ill. 210, 11 Am. Rep. 59.
78. Walker, loc. cit. supra, note 42.
79. Continental Oil Co. v. Graham (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 8 S. W. (2d)
719.
80. Iglehart v. Crane & Wesson (1866) 42 Ill. 261; Lock v. Fulford
(1869) 52 I1. 166; Moore v. Chandler (1871) 59 Ill. 466; Metzger v. Emmel
(1919) 289 111. 52, 124 N. E. 360.
81. (1898) 172 Ill. 329, 50 N. E. 127.
82. Daughtee v. Ohio Oil Co. (1909) 151 Ill. App. 102, 93 A. L. R. 469;
Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co. (1931) 260 Ill. 169, 102 N. E. 381; Poe v. Ulrey(1908) 233 Ill. 56, 84 N. E. 46; Indiana Oil and Gas Co. v. McCrory (1914)
42 Okla. 136, 140 Pac. 610; Bradford Oil Co. v. Blair (1886) 113 Pa. 142,
4 Atl. 218; Summers, Oil & Gas (1st ed. 1926) sec. 126.
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term" lease, such a duty attaches within a reasonable time after
execution of the instrument. 3 Under any kind of lease, where
the leased land is in danger of being drained by operations upon
adjacent lands, the courts have commonly implied a duty in the
lessee to drill offset wells.84 A failure to fulfill the implied obliga-
tion under any of the above situations suffices to establish a for-
feiture and to permit the lessor to maintain an action of eject-
ment. 15
The right of the lessor to avoid the lease, to enjoin operations,
or to defeat an action of specific performance at the instance of
the lessee, because of a failure of consideration is less clear. In
Watford Oil and Gas Co. v. Shipman8 the lease recited a con-
sideration of one dollar, provided for a one-eighth royalty, and
contained a clause permitting the lessee to surrender the lease
at any time upon a payment of one dollar. The lessee brought
a bill to enjoin a junior lessee from drilling, which the court
viewed as an attempt to obtain specific performance by indirect
means and denied, upon the ground that the lessee by virtue of
the surrender clause might nullify the decree by refusing to pro-
ceed further, and "A court of equity will not do a vain and use-
less thing by rendering a decree settling the rights of parties
which one may set aside at his will.11B  No specific reference was
made to the doctrine of lack of mutuality, but the equitable rule
applied was clearly based upon a want of mutuality of remedies.
At the same term of court, in a suit by the lessor to cancel an
identical lease as a cloud on title, 8 based upon a lack of mutual-
ity and non-payment of the recited consideration, the court de-
nied relief on the ground that, while the courts would inquire
into the consideration for the purpose of determining the right
to specific performance, it would not permit parol evidence for
the purpose of invalidating the instrument. The court said
further, in respect to the claim of lack of mutuality, that, in the
absence of fraud, where the parties were competent to contract,
such surrender clauses did not make the contracts invalid. The
case, while apparently distinguishing between the application of
the equitable doctrine in suits for specific performance and for
83. Powers v. Bridgeport Oil Co. (1909) 238 Ill. 397, 87 N. E. 381;
Brown v. Vandergrift (1875) 80 Pa. 142; Harris v. Ohio Oil Co. (1897)
52 Ohio St. 118, 48 N. E. 502.
84. Summers, Oil & Gas. (1st ed. 1926) sec. 122.
85. Ibid.
86. Watford Oil Co. v. Shipman (1908) 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53, 122
Am. St. Rep. 144.
87. 84 N. E. at 54.
88. Poe v. Ulrey (1908) 233 11. 56, 84 N. E. 46.
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cancellation, in fact by its language places in doubt the applica-
tion of the doctrine to any of these leases. A few months later
the court in Cortelyou v. Barnsdalls9 affirmed a cancellation of
a lease for want of mutuality, but the case is plainly distinguish-
able in that no consideration was even recited. However, the
court in its opinion relied most strongly upon the lessee's power
of withdrawal as depriving the contract of the necessary ele-
ment of mutuality. The resulting uncertainty is important in
view of the fact that most courts deny that there is any fatal
want of mutuality.9 The theory underlying the judicial invalida-
tion of oil and gas leases containing optional drilling clauses has
been criticized as resting on two false hypotheses: first, that an
oil lease is an executory contract under which no interest vests
prior to discovery; and, second, that prospective royalties are
the sole consideration for the lease.91 That an oil lease is not
executory in Illinois but creates a present vested interest in land
from the date of its execution has been consistently held since
the very first case upon the subject. 2 In a great majority of
the states the courts hold, in accordance with the general con-
tracts rule, that one dollar is sufficient consideration; conse-
quently whether a present vested interest in land is created is
immaterial since the independent consideration supports the
whole contract.'3 Aside from the right to cancellation of the
lease, it should be noted that the United States Supreme Court
held in Smith v. Guffey, 94 under facts similar to those in the
Watford case,95 that suits of this nature are not for specific per-
formance of executory contracts but to protect a present vested
estate from waste. The objection of lack of mutuality is there-
fore not pertinent. This case, having gone up from Illinois, might
be expected to exert considerable persuasive effect. Against this,
however, must be reckoned the fact that the other states applying
the doctrine of want of mutuality are Oklahoma" and Indiana,97
89. (1908) 236 Ill. 138, 86 N. E. 200.
90. See Summers, Validity of Oil and Gas Leases (1925) 34 Yale L. J.
383, 392.
91. Summers, Oil & Gas (Ist ed. 1926) 251, sec. 72.
92. Bruner v. Hicks (1908) 230 Ill. 536, 82 N. E. 888, 120 Am. St. Rep.
332.
93. Summers. loc. cit. supra, note 91.
94. (1914) 237 U. S. 101. -
95. Watford Oil Co. v. Shipman (1908) 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53, 122
Am. St. Rep. 144.
96. Superior Oil & Gas Co. v. Mehlin (1910) 25 Okla. 809, 108 Pac. 545;
Kalachnv v. Galbreath (1910) 26 Okla. 772, 110 Pac. 902; Hill Oil Co. v.
White (i916) 67 Okla. 247, 170 Pac. 691.
97. Advance Oil Co. v. Hunt (1917) 66 Ind. App. 228, 116 N. E. 340.
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the views of which states have greatly influenced the develop-
ment of the Illinois law. Should the court continue to follow the
Oklahoma and Indiana rule, the lessee will have no remedy to
enforce the terms of his lease against the lessor or his assigns
unless he has himself performed or has placed himself in a posi-
tion where he is bound to perform.
The surrender clause is commonly found in modern leases.
Other types are what are known as "fixed term," "unless," and
"drill or pay" leases. 8 The first provides for the drilling of a
well within the term which is for a definite period of years. The
second provides that the lease is to last for a certain term and
then terminate "unless" delay rentals are paid or drilling begun.
The third type provides that lessee shall drill within a specified
time or pay delay rentals. The objection raised to leases con-
taining a surrender clause would apply equally to fixed term and
"unless" leases. In either case the lessee is under no obligation
either to drill or pay rentals, and the question of consideration
stands upon the same basis as if a surrender clause were in-
cluded. However, the courts have construed the "drill or pay"
type as effecting a forfeiture for failure to drill only where the
lessor elects to consider it so and leaving him free to waive the
forfeiture and insist upon the delay rentals for the remainder
of the term.99 Since the lessee under such construction is abso-
lutely bound to either drill or pay delay rentals, the courts might
be more hesitant to find a lack of mutuality of remedies.
ROBERT G. BURNSIDE.t
98. Following are examples of leases construed by the courts: "To have
and hold-for and during the term of 25 years * * * and so long there-
after as oil and gas shall continue to be found." Nesbit v. Godfrey (1893)
155 Pa. 251, 25 Atl. 621. "This lease shall be null and void unless the
lessee shall pay $10 for each month completion is delayed beyond the time
above mentioned." Glasgow v. Chartiers Oil Co. (1892) 152 Pa. 48, 25
Atl. 232. "In case of a failure to complete one well within such time, the
said parties * * * agree to pay * * * $1000 per annum-as consideration
for such yearly delay." Galey v. Kellerman (1888) 123 Pa. 491, 16 Atl. 474.
99. Galey v. Kellerman (1888) 123 Pa. 491, 16 Atl. 474; Jones v. West-
ern Pa. Natural Gas Co. (1892) 146 Pa. 204, 23 Atl. 386; Johnstown v.
Franklin R. R. Co. v. Egbert (1892) 152 Pa. 53, 25 Atl. 151. See also
Summers, Oil & Gas (1st ed. 1926) see. 105.
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